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In this paper we investigate properties of several randomness generation protocols in the device
independent framework. Using Bell-type inequalities it is possible to certify that the numbers
generated by an untrusted device are indeed random. We present a selection of certificates which
guarantee two bits of randomness for each run of the experiment in the noiseless case and require
the parties to share a maximally entangled state. To compare them we study their efficiency in the
presence of white noise. We find that for different amounts of noise different operators are optimal
for certifying most randomness. Therefore the vendor of the device should use different protocols
depending on the amount of noise expected to occur. Another of our results that we find particularly
interesting is that using a single Bell operator as a figure of merit is rarely optimal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking properties of quantum me-
chanics is that it is intrinsically random. Moreover, if
there exist only a slightly random processes, then also
entirely free ones do [1, 2].
Random number generation is an important issue in
computer science. Random numbers have many applica-
tions in such topics as cryptography, authentication [3],
gambling and system modeling.
Most of the random number generators (RNGs) are
basing on purely algebraical manipulation on initial seed.
Since the series of numbers produced by such genera-
tors are created in a deterministic manner, these RNGs
are called pseudo–random number generators (PRNGs).
There also exist RNGs basing on some chaotic classical
physical processes such as electric or atmospheric noise
or by estimating the entropy of hardware interrupts (for
example in /dev/random RNG on Linux systems). To
make sure that given source of numbers is reliable, some
statistical tests may be applied [4]. Still, these tests
can never give a guarantee that the numbers were in-
deed trustworthy, that is they cannot be predicted by an
adversary.
In this situation it is natural to try to use properties of
quantum mechanics in order to generate entirely random
sequences of numbers. There were efforts making use of
such quantum processes like nuclear decay (for example
HotBits [5]) or photons hitting a semi–transparent mirror
(for example id Quantique RNGs [6]). However when
using one of the commercially available quantum random
number generators (QRNGs) we still have to trust the
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vendor of the device.
Therefore many efforts have been made in the quantum
information theory to attain a reliability while not trust-
ing the device and even not knowing how does it work.
Such an approach, introduced in [7], is called device in-
dependent. Instead of investigating the internal working
of the device in some case it is sufficient to perform tests
on its outputs.
Recently the violation of certain Bell inequalities as
a certificate of randomness for series from RNG has
been used within the device independent approach[8–12].
These protocols were randomness expanders, as they use
some initial amount randomness to obtain more more of
it. In [8, 9] as a certificate of randomness the violation of
the CHSH Bell inequality[13] was used, while in [10] the
GHZ correlations were used instead.
A. Purpose of this paper
Suppose there is a honest vendor that wants to produce
and sell QRNGs. His problem is the lack of trust among
his potential customers. Since he does not wants to cheat
his clients, he can make the design of his device open.
But still some parties may distrust that the device is
construed in declared manner.
The laws of quantum mechanics give him a way to con-
vince his customers, that they do not need to know the
internal working of the device to be sure that they get
secure randomness. Using some form of Bell inequalities,
they may check, after some statistical tests, that the de-
vice produces certain amount of randomness, regardless
of the way it has been constructed. Therefore, our honest
vendor can propose that his costumers use the protocol
described in [9]. However, he still needs to decide which
2Bell inequality to use as a certificate1. This device will
consist of three parts: two measurement apparatuses and
a source of entangled states. The vendor’s technology
limits the quality (purity) of the states that his source
can produce. Let’s assume that they are Werner states
ρw = p·|ψ−〉 〈ψ−|+(1−p)· 14 , that is singlets with admix-
ture of white noise. The question that we try to answer in
this paper is: Which certificate allows to guarantee most
randomness for the given quality of the source measured
by p? Using it will allow our vendor to maximally exploit
the source he has.
All Bell inequalities considered in this paper are maxi-
mally violated with pure singlet states. In the noisy case
values attainable by Bell operators2 are multiplied by p.
In this paper we first make a short inspection of min–
entropy and Bell inequalities. Then we present 6 oper-
ators, that in noiseless situation may certify two bits of
randomness. 3 of them are based on known Bell inequal-
ities, Braunstein–Caves family [14], CHSH [13] and T 3
[12]. After that we describe a method we used to find
other certificates. Then we give 3 most interesting exam-
ples found this way. Using semi–definite programming we
compare the robustness of presented certificates. Finally
we investigate the potential of using CHSH inequality to
improve presented protocols.
B. Min–entropy
One of commonly used measures of randomness is min–
entropy [15], denoted H∞. For given discrete probability
distribution P = p1, . . . , pn it is defined as
H∞(P ) ≡ − log2
(
max
i
(pi)
)
(I.1)
Note that min–entropy is directly related to the guess-
ing probability of the value of a particular variable with
distribution P with strategy when one guesses the most
probable result. In the context of guessing cryptographic
keys, min–entropy is a measure of the difficulty of guess-
ing the easiest single key in a given distribution of keys
[3].
Having some string of characters from a source with
given min–entropy per character it is possible to ex-
tract it’s randomness, that is create a shorter string with
higher min–entropy per character [16–18]. We use min-
entropy as the measure of the efficiency of the protocol
throughout the paper.
1 The choice of the certificate is his only choice. Therefore, in
the whole paper we identify a certificate with a protocol and use
these two terms interchangeably
2 We are assuming that Bell operators are linear functions of corre-
lations, which is more strict that general case where Bell operator
is a linear combination of probabilities. All Bell operators used
in this paper meet this condition.
II. RANDOMNESS CERTIFICATION
PROTOCOLS
In this paper we investigate the applicability for ran-
domness certification of selected Bell operators, described
below. Since we are working in device independent sce-
nario, it is worth to notice that we have no insight into
the workings of the device. We do not know what how
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are carried out, which
results may even have outcomes predetermined by the
constructor of the apparatus. The only thing we have
access to, are outcomes that Alice and Bob get.
We assume that Alice’s and Bob’s devices are sepa-
rated during the measurements. This assumption is es-
sential, since only in this case the violation of Bell in-
equality has any meaning3. The separation may be for
example space–like, if we assume that the signal may not
travel between Alice’s and Bob’s part before the results
are collected.
If we want the randomness not only to be fair (for
example for gambling and system modeling purposes),
but also to be confidential (for example for cryptogra-
phy or authentication), we also have to assume that the
untrusted device do not communicate with the world out-
side. Without this assumption even the fair RNG may
send the results to the adversary.
We will measure the randomness of a given pair of
settings using min–entropy. For each pair (a, b) of choices
of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement settings, there exist
a distribution P (A,B|a, b) of pairs of outcomes. Min–
entropy of the pair of (a, b) is the min–entropy of the
distribution P (A,B|a, b).
In the following we assume that all measurements give
results +1 or −1.
We denote by A+, A− Alice’s projector on results +1
and −1 respectively, and similarly B+, B− for Bob. Since
outcomes are binary we have A+ + A− = 1 , and the
same for Bob’s projectors. Then C(a, b) = 4 ·A+B+− 2 ·
A+ − 2 · B+ + 1 is the correlation operator. We denote
by Cor(a, b) ≡ P (A = 1, B = 1|a, b) + P (A = −1, B =
−1|a, b)−P (A = 1, B = −1|a, b)−P (A = −1, B = 1|a, b)
the correlations between the binary results obtained by
Alice when she chooses measurement a with Bob’s results
with measurement settings set to b. If ρ is the state
describing the whole device (including Alice’s and Bob’s
parts, which may be entangled), then Tr (ρC(a, b)) =
Cor(a, b) and Cor(a, b) may be estimated by collecting
statistics of subsequent measurement results.
The measurement settings and the device have to be
independent. One of the ways to assure that is to choose
these settings randomly. Since in such a situation ini-
tial randomness is needed, protocols described below are
randomness expanders.
3 In fact this is a way to assert in the device independent sce-
nario that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements may be treated alge-
braically as commuting.
3From theoretical point of view it is important to men-
tion the possibility, that from fundamental point of view
both measurement choices and results are predetermined.
This loophole in Bell inequalities is called superdetermin-
ism and makes all efforts towards generation of random-
ness pointless.
Below we present 6 different randomness certification
protocols. First of them is based on a well known
Braunsein–Caves Bell inequalities. Second one makes
use of a pair of Bell operators, which are a decompo-
sition of CHSH inequality. Third one consists of three
Bell inequalities, with two of them being CHSH. Three
remaining protocols make use of other Bell inequalities
described below.
A. Braunstein–Caves inequalities
In [14] a family of chained Bell inequalities was intro-
duced. The general formula for nth Braunstein–Caves
operator is
BCn = C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)
+ C(3, 4) + . . .+ C(n− 1, n− 1) + C(n− 1, n)
+ C(n, n)− C(n, 1)
(II.1)
The maximal value obtainable in quantum mechanics
for nth Braunstein–Caves inequality is 2 ·n · cos ( pi
2·n
)
. In
particular
BC3 = C(1, 1)+C(1, 2)+C(2, 2)+C(2, 3)+C(3, 3)−C(3, 1)
(II.2)
is limited by 5.19.
If we consider the source’s quality measured by p, then
the maximal value is multiplied by p.
We check the min–entropy guarantied by the violation
of Braunstein–Caves inequality for the following three
cases:
• for n = 3 for the min-entropy of 1st setting for Alice
and 3rd setting for Bob4,
• for n = 5 of settings (1, 4)5,
• for n = 7 of settings (1, 5).
B. E0 and E1
In this case instead of taking only a single operator
corresponding to some Bell inequality, we use more than
one for randomness certification.
4 Similar results would be obtained for these pairs of settings: (2, 1)
and (3, 2).
5 Similar results are for pairs (2, 5), (3, 1), (4, 2) and (5, 3).
Single CHSH operator may be decomposed into other
Bell operators. Let us consider the following two opera-
tors:
E0 = C(1, 1) + C(1, 2) (II.3a)
E1 = C(2, 1)− C(2, 2) (II.3b)
From Uffink’s inequality[19] it follows that the max-
imal values of II.3 lie on a circle of radius 2. Taking
into account symmetries of these operators, their maxi-
mal values obtainable in quantum mechanics may be pa-
rameterized in the following manner:
E0,max(φ) = 2 · cos(φ) (II.4a)
E1,max(φ) = 2 · sin(φ) (II.4b)
with φ ∈ [0, pi
2
]
. The classical limit for the sum of values
of these operators is 2. Thus for φ ∈ {0, pi
2
}
classical and
quantum limits are equal.
Similarly like for previously described Bell operators,
if the noise p occurs, then the values in II.4 have to be
multiplied by this value. In such cases the quantum limit
of the sum of II.3 may be achieved for a wider range of
values of φ.
Later in this paper we will examine the min–entropy
for measurement settings pair (2, 1) as a function of φ for
maximal values of the operators II.3 for different values
of noise. Then we will find the optimal angle φ as a
function of noise.
Let us note that this protocolcertificate requires both
Alice’s and Bob’s parts of the device to have only 2 possi-
ble measurement settings. It is the smallest requirements
among all presented protocols.
C. T3 with an additional condition
Let us consider a scenario in which Alice has 4 pos-
sible measurement settings and Bob has 3, each having
2 possible outcomes. In [12] the following Bell operator
was used:
T3 = C(1, 1) + C(2, 1) + C(3, 1) + C(4, 1)
+ C(1, 2) + C(2, 2)− C(3, 2)− C(4, 2)
+ C(1, 3)− C(2, 3) + C(3, 3)− C(4, 3)
(II.5)
Now let us take two additional Bell operators, which
are identical to CHSH with certain choices of settings:
CHSH1 = C(1, 1) + C(3, 1) + C(1, 2)− C(3, 2) (II.6a)
CHSH2 = C(2, 1) + C(4, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(4, 2) (II.6b)
The maximal value of II.5 that may be obtained in
quantum mechanics is 4 · √3 ≈ 5.928, and for II.6 is
2 · √2 ≈ 2.82.
If we impose on the device a condition that both opera-
tors II.6 achieve the value of at least 0 ≤ C ≤ 2 ·√2, then
the maximal value of II.5 is a function of C, T3,max =
4T3,max(C). We require the device to obtain this maximal
value. In the case when we cope with noise or imperfec-
tions of the device, where 0 < p < 1, then we have to
multiply all II.5 and II.6 by p.
Assuming these conditions we will check the lower
bound on the min–entropy, as a function of C with max-
imal possible value of II.5, for Alice’s setting 1 and Bob’s
3.
D. Certificates obtained randomly
The three previous cases were chosen by us because
they rely, at least to some extent on known Bell inequali-
ties. In order to learn more about Bell operators certify-
ing randomness we have used some randomized method
of finding them.
Most of the known interesting operators are in form
∑
i,j
αi,j · C(i, j) (II.7)
where α ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i enumerates Alice’s settings, and
j Bob’s settings.
We have considered operators that have this form with
4 settings for Alice and 3 settings for Bob. In this case
there is around half a million different operators and we
have randomly chosen a representative sample of around
25 thousand for further studies. Then, for each choice we
have computed min–entropy with noise parameter p =
0.95 using semi–definite programming (which method is
described in more details in section IV with results). The
histogram presenting the number of operators that certify
given randomness is shown in table I.
min–entropy 0-0.05 0.05-0.1 0.1-0.15 0.15-0.2
Bell inequalities 12853 689 722 696
min–entropy 0.2-0.25 0.25-0.3 0.3-0.35 0.35-0.4
Bell inequalities 939 907 850 1324
min–entropy 0.4-0.45 0.45-0.5 0.5-0.55 0.55-0.6
Bell inequalities 1176 839 1062 678
min–entropy 0.6-0.65 0.65-0.7 0.7-0.75 0.75-0.8
Bell inequalities 493 155 91 15
TABLE I. Number of Bell inequalities that have been ran-
domly chosen depending on the min–entropy they certify un-
der noise p = 0.95.
The most interesting operators are these, which certify
the most randomness.
Among tested operators 41 certified more than 0.72
bits of randomness under high noise. These operators
form 4 distinct groups that have identical maximal value
and randomness certification properties. First of these
groups (with 9 drawn instances) of them revealed to
be isomorphic6 to BC3 described in IIA. The remain-
ing three groups are described in IID 1 (with 6 instances
drawn) and IID 2 (with 15 and 11 instances drawn, re-
spectively).
1. Modified CHSH
Now let us consider the following Bell operator which
is similar to one used in [20]. We call in modified CHSH
because it is a CHSH operator with one additional cor-
relation function.
Let us take operator of the following form:
C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2)− C(2, 3) (II.8)
Under quantum mechanics its value is limited to 1+2·√2.
First four terms form a CHSH operator.
The protocol requires the device to reach the maximal
value of this operator (multiplied by p in case with noise).
Further in the paper we will examine the min–entropy
with pair of settings (1, 1).
2. Other inequalities
Let us consider the following Bell inequalities:
I1 = C(1, 2)− C(1, 3)− C(2, 1)− C(2, 2)
+C(3, 1) + C(3, 3) + C(4, 1)
≤ 1 + 6 · cos
(pi
6
)
≈ 6.19
(II.9)
and
I2 = −C(1, 2) + C(1, 3) + C(2, 1) + C(2, 2) + C(2, 3)
+C(3, 2)− C(3, 3) + C(4, 1) + C(4, 2) + C(4, 3)
≤ 2 + 4 ·
√
2 ≈ 7.66
(II.10)
These two were taken as examples from wider groups
of inequalities, that uses 4 measurement settings of Al-
ice and 3 of Bob, and consist of 7, respectively 10, cor-
relations. Inequalities in both of these groups have the
same efficiency in generating min–entropy with noise. In-
equalities form the first group are similar to these from
Braunstein–Caves family. The pair of measurement set-
tings for which the min–entropy will be investigated is
(1, 1).
The same as in protocols based on Braunstein–Caves
inequalies (II A) and modified CHSH (IID 1), random
number generation protocols using these inequalities re-
quire the device to reach the maximal value of appropri-
ate operator (multiplied by p in case of noise).
6 Up to two operations. First is a reordering of measurement set-
tings, and second is a change of signs of results for one setting of
one party.
5III. IMPROVING CERTIFICATES WITH THE
CHSH INEQUALITY
Although CHSH inequality is not able to certify two
bits of randomness even for p = 1, it is quite efficient for
p ≤ 0.9. In fact in this case it is able to guarantee more
randomness than most of the two bit protocols, as it is
shown in the table II.
p global local
0.99999 1.21757 0.99090
0.999 1.12231 0.91155
0.95 0.58411 0.47234
0.9 0.37757 0.30718
0.8 0.13510 0.11362
TABLE II. Randomness certified by CHSH inequality for dif-
ferent noises (see text).
Knowing this property some of the above certificates
may be improved if an additional condition for CHSH
inequality is imposed. This can be only done when the
original certifying operator includes CHSH which is the
case in (II.5) and (II.8).
In the table III certificate II C (T3C) is compared with
it’s version taking into the account only the maximal vi-
olation of (II.5) attainable for the given amount of noise.
p T3 T3C
0.99999 1.3294 1.7871
0.999 1.2171 1.4101
0.95 0.55873 0.5931
0.9 0.19515 0.3072
0.8 0 0.1136
TABLE III. Comparison of min–entropies certified by T3
(II.5) alone and with two additional CHSH conditions (II C).
CHSH inequality has also demonstrated its effective-
ness for improving certificate IID 1 (modified CHSH).
Combining it with a condition C(1, 2)+C(1, 3)+C(2, 2)−
C(2, 3) ≥ p · 2 · √2 gives the results shown in the table
IV.
p Original II D 1 Improved IID1
0.99999 1.9764 1.9764
0.999 1.7751 1.7751
0.95 0.7775 0.78024
0.9 0.4365 0.45443
0.8 0.0468 0.1342
TABLE IV. Certificate IID 1 with additional CHSH condition
compared to the original one.
This protocol for low noises is almost as efficient as
IIA (BC3, which is the most efficient in this case), while
requiring less measurement settings. For high noises this
protocol is very close to II B (E0 with E1), while not
requiring to fit parameters for particular p parameter.
For intermediate amounts of noise it’s the best one.
CHSH appears also in (II.10) but in this case imposing
its violation does not help. We believe that it stems from
the fact that (II.10) and any CHSH operator appearing
in ti cannot be simultaneously maximally violated.
IV. RESULTS
The following results were obtained using the NPA
method introduced and developed in papers [21, 22].
This method brings out an infinite hierarchy of condi-
tions, that is satisfied by any set of quantum correla-
tions. Each level of this hierarchy may be mapped into
the semi-definite optimization problem. Such a problem
may be efficiently solved numerically using the primal–
dual interior point algorithm [23–25].
All the results were obtained using level Q2 of the
NPA hierarchy, only results for Braunstein–Caves in-
equality for n = 7 was calculated in level Q1+AB due
to high computer’s memory consumption. Since the con-
ditions of these levels do not contain all the laws of quan-
tum mechanics, when computing min–entropy we get a
lower bound of its value, so all of the examined protocols
may give even more randomness than the presented data
shows7. In fact each of the levels of the hierarchy corre-
sponds to some set of polynomial conditions of a finite
degree. In all the cases we take into account the worst
case, that is maximize each of the probabilities of given
output, independently.
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FIG. 1. Comparison of lower bounds on min–entropies for
protocols described in IIA (based on Braunstein–Caves in-
equalities) as a function of noise.
7 In other words, we assume less than quantum mechanics. In
particular we do not assume no–signaling principle.
6The results for the protocol II A, that uses Braunstein–
Caves operators, as a function of noise, are shown on the
figure 1. For all values of noise the simplest operator,
BC3 (see II.2) gives the highest min–entropy.
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FIG. 2. Lower bound on min–entropy for protocol described
in II B (E0 with E1) as a function of φ (see equation II.4) for
different noises.
In the figure 2 the results for protocol described in II B
(E0 with E1) are shown. For parameter φ equal 0 and
pi
2
the min–entropy is 0, since then the possible values
of II.3 in quantum and classical cases are the same, so
device’s behavior may be implemented classically giving
no warranty on randomness. An important result is that
the optimal angle between average values of operators
II.3 depends on the noise parameter p. This dependence
is shown on the table V.
p φ
0.9999999 0.0252
0.999999 0.0452
0.99999 0.0811
0.9999 0.1460
0.999 0.2638
0.99 0.4562
0.95 0.6179
0.9 0.6948
0.85 0.7357
0.8 0.7617
TABLE V. Optimal angle between E0 and E1 depending on
noise.
The figure 3 shows the results for protocol described
in II C (T3C). It is worth to notice that as parameter C
approaches it maximal value 2·√2, then the min–entropy
tends to 1 (in the case without noise). The min–entropy
strongly depends on C. This dependence is shown in the
table VI.
Considering the bound on the value of the operator
T 3 (II.5, not shown on the figure), it is maximal for C =
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FIG. 3. Lower bound on min–entropy for protocol described
in II C (T3C) as a function of C (see text) for different noises.
p 0.999999 0.99999 0.9999 0.999
C
p
2.826 2.82 2.8 2.75
p 0.99 0.95 0.9 0.8
C
p
2.6 2.55 2.828 2.828
TABLE VI. Optimal value of parameter C for protocol II C
(T3C) depending on noise.
2.3094116. For high noises (p < 0.95) min–entropy has
local minimum near this point.
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FIG. 4. Comparison of lower bounds on min–entropies for
protocols described in IID 1 (modified CHSH) and IID 2
(other randomly generated protocols) as a function of noise.
The figure 4 contains the results for protocols using in-
equalities described in II D 1 (modified CHSH) and IID 2
(other randomly generated operators).
It can be seen that the protocol II A using Bell in-
equality II.2 (BC3) gives the largest amount of random-
ness comparing to other described protocols, when the
noise parameter p is larger than 0.9. Different operators
from Braunstein–Caves family give less min–entropy for
all amounts of noise and requires more settings for each
7party8.
For high noises (p ≈ 0.8) the largest min–entropy is
obtained using protocol II B (E0 with E1). The main
disadvantage of this protocol is the necessity to chose
the angle parameter individually for each noise.
The certificate II C (T3C) shares with II B (E0 with
E1) the need for choosing its parameter (in this case C)
for the given noise. Similarly it gives good results for
high noises (p ≈ 0.8), but not as good as II B. It also
requires more measurement settings.
Using modified CHSH (II D 1) and certificates I1 and
I2 (II D 2) for smaller noises (p ≥ 0.9), the amount of
achieved randomness is slightly smaller that the random-
ness form the protocol BC3 (II A with Bell inequality
II.2). However, protocol based on modified CHSH in-
equality requires less measurement settings than BC3.
Protocols with more complicated Bell inequalities I1
and I2 slightly differ depending on the amount of noise.
For p ≥ 0.999 the inequality I1 (II.9) gives more ran-
domness than I2 (II.10), while for p ≤ 0.999 I2 gives
more randomness than I1.
Comparison of all protocols described in this paper
may be found in the tables VII and VIII.
p BC3 BC5 BC7 E0E1
a T3C
0.99999 1.9769 1.9656 1.9537 1.7854 1.7871
0.999 1.7792 1.6841 1.5917 1.4013 1.4101
0.95 0.7885 0.5534 0.4258 0.6484 0.5931
0.9 0.4474 0.2342 0.1064 0.4163 0.3072
0.8 0.0709 0.0000 0.0000 0.1461 0.1136
a Values for optimal angle parameter.
TABLE VII. Comparison of protocols BC3, BC5, BC7 (II A),
E0E1 (IIB) and T3C (IIC) for different noises.
p modified CHSH I1 I2
0.99999 1.9764 1.9753 1.9742
0.999 1.7751 1.7649 1.7558
0.95 0.78024 0.7219 0.7262
0.9 0.45443 0.3625 0.3959
0.8 0.1342 0.0000 0.0398
TABLE VIII. Comparison of protocols II D 1 (modified
CHSH) and IID2 (I1 and I2) for different noises. In the
column corresponding to modified CHSH we give the result
for its improved version.
8 It is important for a protocol to use not many measurement
settings, as they require more initial randomness for expansion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented several certificates for ran-
domness generation protocols. We find that there is no
unequivocally most efficient one for all the amounts of
noise. On the other hand some are clearly better than
the others.
For low noises (p ≥ 0.92) the most randomness may be
obtained using the certificate IIA based on Braunstein–
Caves inequality. This protocol requires 3 binary mea-
surements for Alice and for Bob and uses only one in-
equality.
In the case of intermediate noise (0.85 ≤ p ≤ 0.92)
the protocol IID 1 with additional CHSH condition (III)
certifies most randomness. It requires 2 binary measure-
ments for Alice and 3 for Bob.
Protocol II B based on a pair of operators, E0 and E1,
certifies most randomness among all the compared pro-
tocols for high noises (p ≤ 0.85). It requires 2 binary
measurements for both Alice and Bob and has a param-
eter φ that has to be chosen for a particular noise p for
optimal results.
A comparison of these three protocols is shown on fig-
ure 5.
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FIG. 5. Comparison of three most efficient of investigated
protocols for 0.84 ≤ p ≤ 0.94.
The conclusion of this paper is that a honest vendor of
QRNGs should use one of these three protocols, depend-
ing on the amount of noise he is expecting the device will
have to cope with.
The first interesting fact that our research has revealed
is that there is no single optimal certificate. But what
is even more remarkable is that the three best ones fall
into three distinct categories. Certificate IIA is just a
Bell operator; II D 1 is a combination of two; and E0
and E1 are not even Bell inequalities, furthermore they
have to be considered with different weights. This proves
that there is more than one place to look for optimal
certificates and although Bell inequality violation is a
necessary condition for device independent certification
of randomness it is not always a good measure of it.
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